Aroop Raha, the Indian Air Force chief recently articulated his
disappointment that the country’s air power was not fully utilized
during the first war with Pakistan in 1948. Likewise, he said, the
airpower was not used during the 1962 war with China.
Raha said that while the Indian Air Force (IAF) was used as a “bridge”
to transport troops to Kashmir for several months but when a military
solution was in sight India went to the United Nations” taking the “the
moral high ground”. The statement is largely true. The Air Force was
used when the situation became desperate with the Pakistani regulars and
tribal raiders came as close as sniffing distance of the Srinagar
airfield threatening to overrun it. Even at that crucial juncture the
prime minister was hesitant. The books and documents that have now come
out clearly show the ambivalence of Prime Minister Nehru.
According to the various documents of the period, it seems a meeting of
the Indian cabinet had been called after the Kashmir Maharaja Hari Singh
signed the Instrument of Accession. Among those present were the Prime
Minister, Home Minister, Vallabhbhai Patel, and Defense Minister Sardar
Baldev Singh. Late Field Marshal Manekshaw, then a junior officer, was
also present presumably to assist his Defense Minister. Towards the end
of the meeting Manekshaw was asked to give his assessment of the
situation in Kashmir which he did with precision. On hearing him, the
consensus was India should intervene as soon as possible but Nehru was
still in two minds and was wondering whether to refer the matter to the
United Nations. That is when the Home Minister, Vallabhbhai Patel
reportedly snapped at him asking whether Nehru wanted to keep Kashmir in
India or let go of it. Nehru is reported to have said, “Of course, I
would like Kashmir to stay in India”. The moment he answered in the
affirmative Sardar Patel asked his assistants to fly the Indian army to
Kashmir. Because of the delay in taking this decision most men in first
few sorties were reportedly, gunned down on landing.
It is indeed surprising that throughout the campaign the Indian Air
Force remained largely under-utilized. It took quite an effort for the
Indian Army to slowly push back the invaders out of the Kashmir Valley
though the Air Force did a commendable job of breaking the backbone of
the invaders by strafing them when they were gathered in strength near
the airfield. The Air Force did play its role in making the invaders run
for their lives. But, that was about all for an offensive role of the
IAF as it was mostly used for logistics – transporting troops and
supplies. In doing so, too, it did some remarkable jobs like those of
landing on an untested airfield built by 40000 refugees in a week’s time
at Poonch and landing Dakotas on an airstrip along the Indus River in
Leh at a height of 11000ft, a height where these planes were not
supposed to fly. Hundreds of sorties were flown with troops and arms and
ammunitions and in the return journey, especially from Poonch, they
brought back thousands of refugees. Even the then Governor General, Earl
Mountbatten had remarked that in his view it was one of the biggest
airlift operations till then anywhere in the world.
Meanwhile, Delhi was getting impatient. Jawaharlal Nehru is reported to
have once said that India could not be fighting this war for months or
even years. Besides, the brutally cold winter was approaching and the
shortage of arms and ammunitions was also telling on the operation. What
is more, he was being advised by the Governor General to refer the
matter to the UN. It seems the Prime Minister had expectations that a
reference to the United Nations would settle the issue speedily.
Unfortunately, that did not happen and it took the UN half a century to
treat it as an unresolved dispute. On reference to it the Kashmir issue
became a victim of the then prevailing Cold War rivalries between the
Western Powers and the Soviet Union. The former had a stake in the State
as it could provide a location from which they could keep an eye on the
latter. The West, therefore, was never inclined that Jammu &
Kashmir should merge with India. For them, for various reasons, Pakistan
was a better option being tactically better located. That attitude
seems to continue till today. At the UN they, therefore, weighed in for
Pakistan and some very biased debates had taken place.
What was most unfortunate, however, was that Nehru’s reference was made
to the UN just as the Indian Army acquired the capability to throw out
the Pakistani raiders from the State. Perhaps, under the influence of
the Governor General the Army Headquarters issued an order not to
initiate further operations without its orders. Some reports say that it
was not Mountbatten but the US intervened and did not want India to
recapture the lost J&K territories. Nonetheless, Mountbatten played a
dubious (double) role. This was, therefore, not as much a matter of
occupying “high moral ground” as of probably succumbing to pressure from
a Big Power. So, a problem that could have been solved in 1948-49,
thanks to Nehru, festers on and on till today and the country that was
the aggressor has acquired in the meantime sharper teeth.
It seems, Nehru’s incapacity to take independent decisions at crunch
situations did quite a lot of damage to India. While in the Kashmir war
of 1948 Earl Mountbatten led him up the ‘garden path’, during the 1962
war with China it was the US ambassador, John Kenneth Galbraith, who was
his advisor. It was largely because of Galbraith that the Indian air
power, much improved after the 1948 Kashmir Operations, was not allowed
to carry our combat operations. Besides, there was a total absence of
intelligence from the other side about the enemy’s capabilities in air
warfare. Intelligence Bureau chief, BN Mullik, did not have any
intelligence about Chinese Air Force establishments in Tibet. In fact,
information was circulated about two Chinese air bases in Tibet which
never existed and, probably, do not exist even today.
There was thus an ‘intelligence vacuum’. For fear of an imagined
retaliation by China, while the IAF planes were made to sit on their
bases, Nehru wrote, surprisingly without consulting the IAF, to Kennedy
requesting for air cover for the cities in the plains. This the US was
not able to provide because of several reasons including the then
ongoing Cuban Missiles Crisis. The result was IAF’s own Toofanies,
Mysteres, Gnats, Hunters and Canberras remained virtually mothballed in
their Eastern bases while the Army was deprived of much needed air
support. The denial to the air force of an offensive role was such an
implausible negative action that it is being researched and debated till
today.
Raha, therefore, is not the only Air Chief to have highlighted this act
of omission. Earlier, Ex IAF chief Air Marshal AY Tipnis, too, blamed
Nehru for not using the country’s airpower and the consequential debacle
in the 1962 war. Likewise, Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal (Retd)
NAK Browne had to say later that the outcome of the 1962 war would have
been different had IAF been allowed an offensive role. But such messy
situations tend to occur when, instead of defense chiefs, wars are
fought, instead of defense forces, by politicians, more so of indecisive
variety like Nehru.
Source>> Groundreport
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